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Humans and monkeys can learn to classify percep-
tual information in a statistically optimal fashion if
the functional groupings remain stable over many
hundreds of trials, but little is known about categori-
zation when the environment changes rapidly. Here,
we used a combination of computational modeling
and functional neuroimaging to understand how hu-
mans classify visual stimuli drawn from categories
whose mean and variance jumped unpredictably.
Models based on optimal learning (Bayesian model)
and a cognitive strategy (working memory model)
both explained unique variance in choice, reaction
time, and brain activity. However, the working
memory model was the best predictor of perfor-
mance in volatile environments, whereas statistically
optimal performance emerged in periods of relative
stability. Bayesian and working memory models pre-
dicted decision-related activity in distinct regions of
the prefrontal cortex and midbrain. These findings
suggest that perceptual category judgments, like
value-guided choices, may be guided by multiple
controllers.
INTRODUCTION
The intertwined problems of how agents learn about the environ-
ment and decide how to act are of central importance in the
behavioral, cognitive, and neural sciences. One fundamental
question is whether decisions rely on an internal model of the
environment, replete with statistical information about the likely
causes of outcomes or sensations, or whether they rely on
simpler mechanisms, such as learning the value of one action
over another (Daw et al., 2005; Gla¨scher et al., 2010; Sutton
and Barto, 1998). All decisions are perturbed bymultiple sources
of uncertainty, but decision making is most demanding when the
environment can change rapidly and without warning. An agent
that explicitly encodes higher-order statistical information aboutthe changing stimulation history, such as the transitional proba-
bilities among hidden or observable states (Green et al., 2010),
their variability (Preuschoff et al., 2008), and rates of change
(Behrens et al., 2007), can tailor decision policy to account for
this uncertainty, for example by discounting past rewards more
steeply when the world changes faster (Rushworth and Behrens,
2008), or by selecting a sure prospect over an equal-valued but
risky one (Christopoulos et al., 2009). Recent research has
begun to map the neural structures that represent the changing
value of states and stimuli, with a focus on the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Hampton et al., 2006), and one recent
postulate is that related neural circuits, for example in the
midbrain or insular cortex, may encode the uncertainty associ-
ated with a prospect (e.g., outcome variance, or risk) (Schultz
et al., 2008). These findings have bolstered the view that,
contrary to classic assumptions in behavioral economics (Kah-
neman et al., 1982), human voluntary choices are fundamentally
rational, and can be described in a probabilistic framework that
explicitly represents choice uncertainty in order to maximize
favorable outcomes.
Much of this research has employed economic tasks where
individuals choose among goods or gambles whose value can
jump, drift, or reverse unexpectedly (Behrens et al., 2007; Boor-
man et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2006; Green et al., 2010; Hampton
et al., 2006). In these tasks, the stimuli are typically simple and
readily discriminable (e.g., colored squares or symbols), but
the choice value (e.g., the conditional probability that an action
will be rewarded, given the stimulus, and possibly a hidden state)
is uncertain, and has to be computed from the past reward
history (outcome uncertainty, or risk). Critically, however, outside
of the laboratory, observers additionally have to deal with uncer-
tainty pertaining to the functional groupings (or categories) to
which sensory stimuli belong. For example, a foraging animal
not only has to update the changing calorific value of a food
source throughout the changing seasons (e.g., Are nuts good
to eat now?) but also has to learn to accurately and efficiently
classify items as belonging to that food category (e.g., Is this is
a nut?). An exceptionally rich tradition has investigated the
cognitive mechanisms by which perceptual information is de-
tected, discriminated, and categorized (Ashby and Maddox,
2005; Swets et al., 1964), and recent neuroscientific research
has offered important insights into the brain mechanismsNeuron 71, 725–736, August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 725
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and Shadlen, 2007; Li et al., 2009; Seger and Miller, 2010).
Behavioral work has emphasized that perceptual classification
in humans can mimic that of a rational agent that explicitly
encodes not only the category mean (e.g., a prototype) but
also the category variability (i.e., uncertainty about class mem-
bership). For example, psychophysical detection (Stocker and
Simoncelli, 2006), multidimensional discrimination (Ashby and
Gott, 1988), multifeature integration (Michel and Jacobs, 2008),
and exemplar clustering (Anderson, 1991) can all be described
with an ideal observer model, such as signal detection theory
(Swets et al., 1964), general recognition theory (Ashby and
Townsend, 1986), or with related Bayesian approaches (Ander-
son, 1991).
Importantly, however, observers in these studies are typically
allowed many hundreds of training trials to learn stable and
predictable category information. With overtraining, rational
models of categorical choice are difficult to distinguish from
simpler, habit-based accounts because highly-trained partici-
pants can produce a pattern of choices that resembles optimal
responding by associating portions of the decision space with
a particular action through extensive stimulus-response learning
(Blair and Homa, 2003). Indeed, an influential framework sug-
gests that model-free mechanisms, that capitalize on the
extended learning history to assign value to actions, may take
precedence in control of action in stable, overlearned environ-
ments (Daw et al., 2005; Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). It thus
remains unknown (1) whether observers learn about the uncer-
tainty associatedwith categorymembership (category variance),
and use it to inform their decisions, and (2) which neural struc-
tures might encode category variability. The purpose of the
current study was to address these questions.
One important feature of unpredictable, fast-changing envi-
ronments is that observers are obliged to distinguish between
unexpected events that occur because of noise (i.e., an outlier)
and those that occur because of a state change in the environ-
ment (Yu and Dayan, 2005). For example, a bus might be late
because of the vagaries of morning traffic (noise), or because
new roadworks have introduced a fundamental delay that should
be budgeted for when estimating subsequent journey times
(a state change). When economic estimates change rapidly,
new learning quickly becomes outdated, and so past category
information should be discounted more steeply when choices
are made (Nassar et al., 2010; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008).
Observers do indeed update their estimates of mean reward
rate more rapidly when the environment is more volatile,
a computation that has been associated with the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC) (Behrens et al., 2007). Model-based learning
about the environment (e.g., explicitly encoding category uncer-
tainty) will be most useful in a volatile world because it allows
observers to distinguish optimally between outliers and those
events that herald a change of state. On the other hand, in a vola-
tile environment estimates of category variance will be of limited
precision and expensive to compute. It thus remains unknown
whether rational strategies will predominate during periods of
environmental stability, or volatility. One efficient way of dealing
with a volatile world would be to simply maintain the most recent
information about each category in short-term memory—equiv-726 Neuron 71, 725–736, August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.alent to updating category values in the frame of reference of the
stimulus (rather than action) with a learning rate that equals or
approaches one.
In pursuit of the question of how category information is
learned, represented, and used to inform classification judg-
ments, thus, we asked participants to classify sequentially
occurring stimuli (oriented gratings) drawn from categories
whose mean and variability (over angle) changed unpredictably
and without warning. Recording brain activity during the task
with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allowed us
to compare observed choices, decision latencies, and brain
activity to those predicted by three computational models that
embodied different hypotheses about how humans learn about
and choose between categories. The first model learned the
mean and variance of the categories in an optimal Bayesian
framework (Bayesian model), the second model learned the
value of action in a given state, i.e., angle (Q-learning [QL]
model), and the third model simply maintained the most recent
category information in memory (working memory [WM] model).
Thesemodels allow us to compare the hypotheses that category
judgments in an unpredictable environment are driven by strate-
gies that rely on ‘‘model-based’’ optimal estimation of uncer-
tainty (Bayesian), ‘‘model-free’’ habit learning (Q-learning), or a
cognitive strategy based on short-term maintenance (working
memory).
We report a number of new findings. First, both the Bayesian
and theWMmodels encoded unique variance in choice, reaction
time (RT), and brain activity, suggesting that participants use
a mixture of model-based categorization strategies. Second,
participants’ tendency to use a decision policy that incorporated
category variance depended on the volatility of the environment,
with the Bayesian model approximating human performance
more closely in relatively unchanging environments, and neural
signatures of choice and learning modulated by category vari-
ability only during stable periods; by contrast, the WM model
prevailed when the environment was more volatile. Finally,
different strategies were associated with dissociable patterns
of decision-related brain activity, with fMRI signals predicted
by the Bayesian model observed in the striatum and medial
prefrontal cortex (PFC), but brain activity predicted by the
working memory strategy activating visual regions, and the
dorsal frontal and parietal cortex. Together, these results
suggest that participants use cognitive strategies involving the
short-term maintenance of information when making decisions
in volatile environments but gradually come to rely on information
about category uncertainty to make more optimal choices as
learning progresses.
RESULTS
On each of 600 trials, 20 participants viewed an oriented stimulus
(full-contrast Gabor patch) that was drawn from one of two cate-
gories defined by orientation, with angular means on trial i of bmai
and bmbi and variances bsai and bsbi (Figure 1A). Subjects received
no instructions regarding the categories but were required to
learn about them by trial and error via an auditory feedback
tone following each decision epoch of 1500 ms. Generative
distributions over angle for the two categories changed
Figure 1. Task Design
(A) Participants viewed a succession of oriented
stimuli (Gabor patches) and responded to each
with a button press. Stimuli were drawn from one
of two categories, A or B (red/blue labels in A not
shown to participants).
(B) Category values for an example block (120
trials), for categories A (red line) and B (blue line).
Underlying lighter bars show the generative mean
and variance for each category. Dashed boxes
highlight periods of common or differing category
variance.
(C) Circles show angular values of stimuli pre-
sented in an example block (red circles, A; blue
circles, B).White-ringed circleswere responded to
correctly by this subject; black-ringed circles
provoked an error. Red and blue lines show the
category mean estimated by the Bayesian model.
Red/blue background shading indicates the
choice probability landscape across angle, with
more red shading indicating angles for which A
was the better choice, and blue shading favoring
the response B, according to the Bayesian model.
Neuron
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episodes of 20 trials, randomly intermixed) to a new mean value
drawn from a uniform distribution (between 90 and 90) with
a standard deviation of either 5 or 20 (Figure 1B). Overall, the
task was challenging, with subjects responding correctly on
68.6% ± 3.9% of trials (range 59%–74%), and overall mean
RTs of 697 ± 131ms. Subjects failed to respond within the dead-
line on an average of 9.6 ± 4.1 (range 5–22) trials, and these trials
were excluded from all further analyses.
We built three competing computational models of categorical
choice and compared them to subjects’ behavioral perfor-
mance. (1) The Bayesian model learned trial-by-trial means
and variances of each category, and their rates of change, in
an optimal Bayesian framework (Figure 1C). On each successive
trial, the model updated a probability space defined by the
possible (angular) values of bmai , bsai , bmbi , and bsbi as well as their
respective rates of change, and marginalized over the space to
estimate current ‘‘best-guess’’ category means and variances
of A and B. Choice values reflected the relative likelihood of A








bmai ; bsai +pYibmbi ; bsbi  (Equation 1)
(2) The QL model learned the value of choices A and B given the
state (stimulus angle), with a single learning rate as a free param-
eter; choice probability values were calculated as the relative
value of responding A versus B:
pðAÞ= Qðs; aÞ
Qðs; aÞ+Qðs;bÞ (Equation 2)
The learning rate was set to be the best-fitting value across the
cohort, a = 0.8; in theory, this extra free parameter gave the
QL model an advantage, but in practice it was the poorestperforming of the three models. (3) The WM model updated
the category means bmai and bmbi using a delta rule with a learning
rate of 1, i.e., resetting category means on the basis of the
most recently viewed category member. Choice probabilities
reflected the relative distance of the stimulus to these current
estimates of A and B:
pðAÞ= jYi+ 1  bmai j
jYi+ 1  bmai j+ Yi+1  bmbi  (Equation 3)
For simplicity, we refer to these values as p(A), i.e., the proba-
bility of choosing A over B. Full details of themodels are provided
in the Experimental Procedures section below.Predicting Choice
We estimated choice values p(A) under each model for succes-
sive stimuli in the trial sequence. Trials were sorted into bins
according to their value of p(A), and observedmean choice prob-
ability was calculated for each bin (Figure 2A). To quantify which
model was the best predictor of observed choice data, we used
multiple regression; parameter estimates are shown in Figure 2B.
Entering all three models together into the regression, each
explained some unique variance in choice behavior (Bayesian
model: t(19) = 8.77, p < 1 3 10
7; QL model: t(19) = 2.4, p <
0.02; WM model: t(19) = 16.6, p < 1 3 10
12). However, across
the subject cohort, the WMmodel was a reliably better predictor
than the Bayesian model (t(19) = 4.07; p < 1 3 10
3) or the QL
model (t(19) = 10.2; p < 13 10
8). To interrogate the data further,
we fit a decision criterion c (0.01 < c < 0.99) to the choice
probability values under eachmodel and compared the resulting
binary trial classification (model choices) to human choices.
Resulting c2 values for each model across values of c are shown
for individual subjects in Figure 2C. Comparing models under
best-fitting values of c, the WM model again outperformed theNeuron 71, 725–736, August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 727
Figure 2. Behavioral Results: Predicting
Choice
(A) The probability of choosing category A plotted
as a function of the log of p(A) calculated by the
Bayesian (left), QL (middle), and WM (right)
models. Grey circles show data from individual
participants; the black line shows the best-fitting
four-parameter sigmoidal function.
(B) Parameter estimates from the probit binomial
regression of model-derived estimates of choice
probability (p(A)) on human observers’ actual
choices, for the three models. Grey circles show
data from individual participants. Asterisks indi-
cate that comparisons among regressors are all
significant at p < 0.001.
(C) Lines show c2 values for each model (red,
Bayes; green, QL; red, WM) reflecting the overlap
between participants’ choices andmodel choices.
Model choices were calculated by applying a
criterion (0.01 < c < 0.99) on p(A) values (x axis).
Each plot is an individual participant. Blue shading
shows criterion values for which the WM model is
more successful than the other two models.
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Perceptual Classification and VolatilityBayesian (t(19) = 2.69; p < 0.05) and the QL models (t(19) = 2.87;
p < 0.01) in pairwise comparison at the group level.
The task was structured such that the true category statistics
jumped every 10 or 20 trials. We wanted to determine whether
participants learned this periodic jump structure, because if so,
this could have disadvantaged the Bayesian model, which has
no way of inferring the periodic structure of the task. Our
approach was 2-fold. First, we asked whether learning rates (fit
by a simple delta rule) differed for the first 8 trials following switch
(when an observer with full knowledge of the 10 trial cycle should
not learn any new information), relative to trials 9–13 following
a switch. In fact, participants learned faster immediately
following a switch (t(19) = 3.15; p < 0.004)—behavior that is well
captured by the WMmodel but that would not be approximated
with a variant of the Bayesian model that optimally inferred the
cyclic task structure. Second, we compared learning rates for
different phases of a 10 trial harmonic across each run (i.e., trials
3–7, 13–17, 23–27, etc. versus trials 1–2, 8–12, 18–22, regardless
of when jumps occurred). These revealed almost identical
learning rates (0.73 versus 0.69, t(19) < 1). If participants had
been explicitly using knowledge about the structure of the
sequence (to which the current Bayesian model has no access),
then we would expect them to learn faster in a period where
jumps were more probable. Together, these two results strongly
suggest that participants do not learn the periodic structure of
the task and that the Bayesian model is not unfairly disadvan-
taged by being blind to the 10–20 trial jump cycle. In fact,
because the Bayesian model outperforms the human partici-
pants, and a model with perfect knowledge of the jumps would
perform even better, the latter would approximate human
behavior yet more poorly.728 Neuron 71, 725–736, August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.Predicting RT
We converted choice probability values
into a quantity that scales with the pro-
bability of making a correct response(Experimental Procedures) and correlated these choice values
with trial-by-trial RT values for each participant (Figure 3A).
Slopes were more negative for the WMmodel than the Bayesian
(t(19) = 11.2; p < 1 3 10
9) and QL models (t(19) = 15.9; p < 1 3
1012), suggesting that choice values from the WM model
captured the most variability in RT (indeed, the slope for the
QL model did not deviate significantly from zero: p = 0.48).
This was confirmed by regression analysis (Figure 3B), which
revealed parameter estimates for the WM model that were sig-
nificantly more negative than for both competing models
(Bayesianmodel: t(19) = 5.76, p < 13 10
5; QLmodel: t(19) = 8.81,
p < 1 3 107).
Predicting Decision-Related fMRI Activity:
Expected Value
Subsequently, we used the threemodels to generate trial-by-trial
predictions about the BOLD response by modeling fMRI data
with parametric regressors scaled by predicted choice values
from each model. Again, we included predictions from all three
models in a single design matrix, allowing them to compete for
variance in brain activity at each voxel across the brain during
the decision epoch (Figure 4A; see Table S1 available online).
Thus, our results reflect the unique contribution of each model
to fMRI signals (the common contribution is shown in Figure S1).
Because estimated choice values reflect the probability that
positive feedback will be obtained, we focused our initial anal-
yses on brain regions known to respond to positive outcomes,
such as the vmPFC, and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)
(Rushworth et al., 2009). Activity in both of these regions was
predicted by the WM model (PCC: 9, 51, 27; t(19) = 9.15, p <
1 3 108; vmPFC: 6, 45, 18, t(19) = 7.87, p < 1 3 106), and
Figure 3. Behavioral Results: Predicting RT
(A) Scatter plots of choice values against RT in
seconds for individual participants, with best-
fitting linear trend lines for the Bayesian (red), QL
(green), and WM (blue) models.
(B) Parameter estimates for the regression of
choice values on RT for the three models. Grey
circles are individual participants. More negative
values indicate a better prediction of RT, i.e., when
choice values are closer to 1, RT is faster. Aster-
isks indicate the significance of the comparison
between betas: *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
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4.02, p < 0.001; vmPFC: 12, 60, 0, t(19) = 3.51, p < 0.002). No
such prediction was observed for the QL model.
Predicting Decision-Related fMRI Activity: Decision
Entropy
The inverse contrast identified voxels that correlated with the
entropy (or conflict) associated with the decision, i.e., how close
the probability of choosing A over B was to chance (p = 0.5)
under each model (Figures 4 and 5 and Table S2). We modeled
the predictions of each model with a unique parametric
regressor and entered these simultaneously into the designNeuron 71, 725–736matrix, allowing the identification of
voxels that responded (1) to the predic-
tions of all three models (shown in Fig-
ure 4), and (2) to predictions of one model
alone. We defined the latter as voxels
where t values were positive-going for
decision entropy, and exceeded those
for the other two models by at least
3.09 (p < 0.001) in both cases (shown in
Figure 5). These analyses offer comple-
mentary information: the former identifies
voxels that correlate with each model for
a given threshold, and the latter identifies
voxels that differ in their degree of
correlation with each model (although
this analysis is limited by the extent to
which regressors are correlated). First,
we found that decision-related BOLD
signals in the anterior insular cortex
were robustly predicted by all three
models (Figures 4B and 5A). Second,
activity predicted by the WM model, but
not the other models, was mainly ob-
served in the extrastriate visual cortex
(peak: 21, 96, 9, t(19) = 9.29; p <
13 108), including the superior occipital
lobe (peak: 30, 81, 33, t(19) = 8.01; p <
1 3 107), as well as dorsal fronto-
parietal sites such as the superior parietal
lobule (peak: 24, 69, 54, t(19) = 15.09;
p < 1 3 1011), dorsolateral PFC (peak:48, 6, 30, t(19) = 7.97; p < 1 3 107), and pre-SMA (peak: 6,
15, 48, t(19) = 7.17; p < 1 3 10
6).
The Bayesian model was also associated with unique patterns
of brain activity, but these fell in the left striatum (peak: 12, 9,
3, t(19) = 6.09; p < 1 3 105), and the supplementary motor
area (SMA) (peak: 3, 0, 57, t(19) = 6.26; p < 1 3 10
5). The SMA
cluster fell immediately caudal to the pre-SMA cluster identified
by the WMmodel; the juxtaposition of the two clusters is shown
in Supplemental Experimental Procedures. Finally, activity in the
left ventrolateral PFC (peak:48, 24, 3, t(19) = 6.45; p < 13 105)
was uniquely predicted by the QL model. These results are
shown in detail in Figures 4 and 5., August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 729
Figure 4. Imaging Results: Choice Value
and Decision Entropy
(A) Voxels for which BOLD signals are stronger
when choice values from the Bayesian (left), QL
(middle), and WM (right) models are higher (i.e.,
when the probability of a correct response is
greater) rendered at a threshold of p < 0.001 onto
a template brain (sagittal slice).
(B) Voxels for which BOLD signals are stronger
when choice values from the three models are
lower (e.g., when p(A) is closest to 0.5, the prob-
ability of correct is lowest, and decision entropy
is highest), shown on three coronal slices. Full-
colored circles highlight clusters that are specific
to either the Bayesian or WM models; dashed
models signal the absence of the corresponding
cluster for the other model (red, SMA; blue, stria-
tum; green, anterior dorsolateral PFC; yellow,
pre-SMA). Black arrows highlight activation in the
anterior insula, which was present in all three
conditions (see also Figure 5A). In both (A) and (B),
the red-white render scale indicates the t value at
each voxel.
Neuron
Perceptual Classification and VolatilityCorrelation with Volatility
We reasoned that participants’ tendency to employ the simple
working memory strategy rather than higher-order model-based
strategies might depend on the volatility in the environment. One
possibility is that participants use information about the variance
of the categories only when the environment is stable and pre-
dictable, when more resources are available for computationally
intensive decision strategies. Alternatively, probabilistic informa-
tion might be deployed when it is most useful, i.e., in volatile
environments, where the category means are changing fast,
and there is more ambiguity about whether unexpected events
are outliers, or reflect a change in the generative mean. We arbi-
trated among these possibilities using the behavioral data by
estimating trial-by-trial errors in the fit of each model to choice
data, and correlating this with the estimated volatility of the
sequence (Experimental Procedures). Statistically reliable posi-
tive correlations were observed for the Bayesian (t(19) = 3.13;
p < 0.003) and QL (t(19) = 2.46; p < 0.02) models, suggesting
that these models fit the observed data better (lower residual
error) when volatility was low. No such correlation was observed
for the WM model (p = 0.58). In a further analysis, we separated
trials into quartiles on the basis of the estimated volatility, and
reran the regression analysis separately for the 25% most
volatile and 25% least volatile trials. The advantage for the WM
model over the Bayesian model on high-volatile trials (t(19) =730 Neuron 71, 725–736, August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.3.81; p < 0.001) was eliminated on low-
volatile trials (p = 0.34). In other words,
observers were more likely to base their
decisions on information about the cate-
gory variance when the trial sequence
was stable than when it was volatile.
This finding prompted us to search for
voxels where fMRI signals correlated
better with Bayesian or QL estimates of
decision entropy under low than highvolatility. We identified voxels in the SMA and ACC that dis-
played such a pattern for estimates of decision entropy pre-
dicted by the Bayesian model (ACC peak: 3, 21, 33, t(19) =
4.54, p < 0.001; SMA peak: 0, 9, 60, t(19) = 4.54, p < 1 3 10
6)
as well as a small cluster in the ACC for the interaction between
volatility and entropy predicted by the QLmodel (peak: 3, 15, 45,
t(19) = 3.96; p < 0.001). No such voxels were identified for theWM
model. These results are shown in Figure 6A and Table S3. This
finding at the time of the decision is complementary to, but does
not contradict, the previous finding that ACC signals scale with
increasing volatility at the time of the outcome.
fMRI Signals for Category Updating
The above analysis of behavioral and brain-imaging data at the
time of the decision suggests that observers display a greater
tendency to use optimal decision strategies when the environ-
ment is more stable. This led us to ask whether neural signals
reflecting updating of information at the time of feedback are
modulated by variance and volatility. In our task, an observer
should update his or her beliefs about the categories on the basis
of the angular disparity between the stimulus presented and
the current estimate of the mean of the category from which
that stimulus was drawn. For example, if an observer who esti-
mates themean of category A to be 45 responds B to a stimulus
presented at 90 and receives negative feedback, that observer
Figure 5. Imaging Results: Comparing Computational Models
(A) Mean parameter estimates for the correlation with decision entropy predicted by the Bayesian (left), QL (middle), andWM (right) models averaged over voxels
falling within independent regions of interest. Bars are colored when parameter estimates are significantly greater than zero at a threshold of p < 0.001. Numbers
in the titles correspond to clusters shown in (B). Error bars are standard error of the mean.
(B) Voxels that correlate with decision entropy for the Bayesian model alone (yellow), the QL model alone (green), and the WMmodel alone (red), rendered onto
axial slices of a template brain. Voxels were deemed to respond to one model alone if the voxel was positive-going for decision entropy, and the relevant t value
was greater than that for the other two models by at least 3.29 (p < 0.001). Numbers refer to brain regions referred to in the text: 1, extrastriate visual regions; 2,
superior parietal lobule; 3, dorsolateral PFC; 4, pre-SMA; 5, striatum; 6, SMA.
Neuron
Perceptual Classification and Volatilitywill probably want to substantially revise his or her beliefs about
category A. However, an observer who is using a statistical
decision strategy will revise this estimate more when category
variance is low than high (Preuschoff and Bossaerts, 2007). We
thus searched for voxels that reflected the angular updating
signal normalized by its variance under low, but not high,
volatility.
Accordingly, we constructed predictors that encoded these
three factors and their two- and three-way interactions (Experi-
mental Procedures), along with regressors encoding the main
effect of stimulus, feedback, and reward. These were then
regressed against brain activity at the time of feedback. The
results are shown in Figure 6B and Table S4. Critically, a three-
way interaction between these factors was observed in the
posterior portion of the cingulate gyrus (peak: 3, 30, 27;
t(19) = 6.03; p < 1 3 10
5) extending into the posterior cingulate
on the right (peak: 12, 54, 9; t(19) = 5.15; p < 1 3 104) and
left (peak: 15, 48, 6; t(19) = 4.76; p < 1 3 104), as well as
the SMA (peak: 6, 9, 63; t(19) = 5.57; p < 1 3 10
4). Moreover,when we tested for significance within an a priori region of
interest (ROI) centered on the dorsal ACC region previously
found to respond to scale prediction errors by volatility (Behrens
et al., 2007), we found an additional cluster (peak: 3, 30, 18;
t(19) = 2.98; p < 0.004).
DISCUSSION
We asked healthy human participants to classify visual stimuli
in a rapidly changing environment, with a view to describing
the computational strategies they use to learn about, and choose
between, perceptual categories. Our analyses compared three
models: the Bayesianmodel learned the statistics of the environ-
ment (e.g., the mean and variance of category information), the
QLmodel learned the value of actions, and theWMmodel simply
stored the last piece of information learned about each of the
categories and used that as a benchmark for future choices.
These models embody different strategies that observers could
use during categorization, strategies that differ in terms of whatNeuron 71, 725–736, August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 731
Figure 6. Imaging Results: Interactions with
Volatility
(A) Voxels responding to the interaction between decision
entropy and volatility, i.e., voxels that predict decision-
related activity more successfully when the environments
is stable than volatile, for the Bayesian, QL, and WM
models. Green rings encircle the SMA and ACC.
(B) Voxels responding to the three-way interaction of
update, category variance, and volatility in the PCC and
retrosplenial cortex. For (A) and (B), activations are
rendered onto a template brain, and the red-white scale
indicates the t value associated with each voxel.
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Perceptual Classification and Volatilityis encoded (first-order, or higher-order information about the
categories), and the rate at which past information is devalued
(immediately, in the WM model; or according to environmental
volatility, in the Bayesian model). Surprisingly, we found that
the simple, working memory model was the best predictor of
choice, RT, and brain activity across the experiment. This
suggests that in our task, human participants favor a fast and
frugal categorization strategy that does not overly tax systems
for storage and processing of decision-relevant information.
Indeed, the WM model was many orders of magnitude more
economical than the Bayesian model. For example, where n is
the sampling resolution of the decision space (over angle), our
computer-based implementation of the WM model demanded
the storage of 2n bits of information per trial, compared to 2n4
bits for the Bayesian model (although of course these values
may not reflect the true neural cost of each model).
Our fMRI analyses also identified specific neural circuits
associated with this simple, memory-based decision strategy.
For example, the WM model was the best predictor of deci-
sion-related activity in a dorsal fronto-parietal network previously
implicated in working memory maintenance (D’Esposito, 2007;
Wager et al., 2004), and superior occipital regions implicated
in storing iconic traces in visual short-term memory (Xu and
Chun, 2006). Together, these data points reveal that a simple,
memory-based process can be used to solve a seemingly
complex and challenging categorization problem, and suggest
that visual and fronto-parietal regions are engaged to do so.
However, we know that participants did not rely exclusively on
this cognitive strategy to make categorical choices, because the
other models—in particular, the Bayesian model—explained
unique variance in choice, RT, and BOLD activity. In other words,
participants switched between different strategies for categori-
zation and, in the process, preferentially activated distinct brain
regions. The dissociable patterns of voxels that were observed
to correlate with decision entropy under each model offer clues
to the strategies involved. For example, in the medial and lateral
PFC, decision-related brain activity predicted by the WM model
fell systematically more anterior to that predicted by the
Bayesian model, activating rostral regions of the lateral PFC
(BA 9/46) that are typically recruited when decision-relevant732 Neuron 71, 725–736, August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.information has to be maintained in the face of
distraction over a prolonged behavioral episode
(Koechlin et al., 2003; Sakai et al., 2002). By
contrast, both models were associated withdecision-related activity in mid-dorsolateral PFC regions falling
at the intersection of BA 8 and 44 (the ‘‘inferior frontal junction’’)
(Brass et al., 2005), where activity tends to reflect the demand of
selection, conditioned on the context (Koechlin and Summer-
field, 2007), and from where category-related information can
be decoded independent of physical input (Li et al., 2009).
Similarly, in the medial PFC, the Bayesian model predicted
decision-related activity in the SMA, and the WM model in the
pre-SMA. Although the relative functional significance of the
SMA and pre-SMA remains controversial (Nachev et al., 2008),
one possibility is that there exists a rostro-caudal gradient in
the medial PFC, by which more anterior regions respond more
vigorously when decisions are based onmotivational information
that is more conditionally complex (Badre and D’Esposito, 2009;
Nachev et al., 2009), or that arose further in the past (Kouneiher
et al., 2009; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2009). One interpretation
of these findings is that cognitive strategies for categorization in
a volatile environment involve maintaining recent exemplar-
based representations active across several intervening trials
at the expense of their competitors and thus recruit PFC struc-
tures known to support cognitive andmotivational control across
a discrete behavioral episode.
By contrast, when decisions are made without the benefit of
explicit working memory information, but based on approxima-
tions of the mean and variance of the categories, they recruit
more posterior zones within the PFC, as well as the striatum.
The latter finding is surprising from the perspective of theories
that have emphasized a role for the basal ganglia in habit learning
(Daw et al., 2005; Dickinson and Balleine, 2002) but squares well
with the finding that the risk associated with an economic pros-
pect (i.e., the variance of the outcome) scales with signals in both
caudate and putamen (Preuschoff et al., 2006; Schultz et al.,
2008). Indeed, dopaminoceptive neurons of the striatum are
known to encode uncertainty associated with an economic deci-
sion, in addition to its value (Bunzeck et al., 2010; Fiorillo et al.,
2003; Tobler et al., 2007); our results imply that this may extend
to situations where the uncertainty pertains to the category of the
stimulus. Finally, the QL model activated preferentially the left
ventrolateral PFC, in tune with a substantial literature implicating
this region in stimulus-response learning (Toni et al., 2001).
Neuron
Perceptual Classification and VolatilityOur analysis of the interaction betweenmodel fits and environ-
mental stability/volatility offered insight into the factors that
prompt participants to switch between memory-based and
higher-order learning strategies for categorical choice. Specifi-
cally, the Bayesian model (but not the WM model) fit the choice
data better when the environmental volatility is low, as if partici-
pants gradually acquired information about category variances.
In our task, ‘‘stable’’ environments consisted of runs of 20–30
trials in which the category mean remained constant—a far
shorter training interval than the hundreds or even thousands
of trials offered in many categorization or sensorimotor tasks
(Ashby and Gott, 1988; Ko¨rding and Wolpert, 2004). Thus, it is
perhaps unsurprising that overall, the WM model provided a
better fit to human choices than an ideal observer model. How-
ever, our data chart clearly the emergence of optimal decision
making as observers are offered a chance to become familiar
with the category statistics.
This notion was also supported by fMRI analyses, which iden-
tified voxels that responded to the interaction between volatility
and decision entropy predicted by the Bayesian model in the
ACC.One interpretation of these data is that the ACC contributes
to choices that are informed by information about the rate of
change of the environment, in line with previous lesion (Kenner-
ley et al., 2006) and fMRI (Behrens et al., 2007) work implicating
this region in making optimal use of past reward history to inform
decisions. Analysis of brain activity at the time of the feedback
also supported this contention. Using an ROI-based analysis,
we found that the ACC region activated in concert with environ-
mental volatility at the time of feedback in Behrens et al. (2007)
was sensitive to ‘‘optimal updating’’ signals defined by the
three-way interaction among angular update, estimated vari-
ability, and volatility. One interpretation consistent with previous
work is that at outcome time, the volatility of the environment is
encoded in the ACC in a fashion that dictates the extent that
subjects will learn from each outcome (Behrens et al., 2007); in
the decision period, ACC activity is only modulated by the
optimal level of uncertainty at times when subjects employ this
optimal strategy (in this task, when the environment is stable).
We additionally found strong optimal updating signals at the
time of feedback in the posterior cingulate gyrus, a brain region
implicated in the representation of uncertainty about rewards
(McCoy and Platt, 2005), and in the choice to make exploratory
decisions (Pearson et al., 2009) in the nonhuman primate.
Admittedly, our current data do not indicate the mechanism
by which, or the cortical locus at which, participants switch
between strategies. Indeed, one possible candidate is the ante-
rior insular cortex, where decision-related fMRI signals were pre-
dicted by all three strategies, and which has been previously
implicated in controlling the switch between behavioral modes
(Sridharan et al., 2008). However, this remains a topic for future
investigation.
Together, our findings suggest that participants adapt their
decision strategy to the demands of the environment, moving
toward statistically optimal behavior when the environment
permits learning about stable and predictable categories (Nis-
bett et al., 1983). By contrast, in volatile environment, agents
adopt a cognitive strategy that is fast and computationally frugal,
and relies on maintenance processes subserved by the PFC.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
A total of 20 healthy participants aged between 18 and 37 years with no history
of psychiatric or neurological disorder, and normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, participated in the experiment. Participants were paid 80 euros for
their participation.Procedure
In each of 5 scanning sessions of 8 min each, subjects viewed 120 succes-
sive, full-contrast Gabor patches that were oriented at between 90 and 90
relative to the vertical meridian. Each stimulus was visible for 1500 ms, during
which period subjects were required to make a categorization judgment by
pressing the right or left button on the response pad. Auditory feedback con-
sisted of an ascending (400/800 Hz) or descending (800/400 Hz) tone of
200 ms, and followed stimulus onset by a variable interval in the range of
3–7 s. On 25% of trials, correct or incorrect feedback engendered a small
monetary gain or loss, which was totaled up and supplemented subjects’
compensation (range 20–30 euros). An interstimulus interval of 1 s intervened
between feedback and the subsequent stimulus. Stimuli were drawn randomly
from category A (60 trials) or B (60 trials) with no constraints, and response-
category assignments were counterbalanced across subjects. Category
means and variances were unstable and independent, and jumped unpredict-
ably every 10 or 20 trials (4 episodes of 10 trials, 4 episodes of 20 trials,
randomly intermixed) to a newmean drawn from a uniform random distribution
with a variance of either 5 or 20.Modeling
Values representing the probability of choosing category A over B under the
Bayesian model were estimated using a hierarchical Bayesian learner that
calculates best-guess estimates of the generative mean and variance of
each category in a Markovian fashion. For each category, a generative model
of the observations is assumed as follows (see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures and Behrens et al. [2007] for a more extensive description of
a related model).
At each trial i, after the true category has been revealed, the probability of
observing the orientation i (given any possible mean and variance) may be
written:
pðYi jmi ; siÞ  Nðmi ; siÞ (Equation 4)
Hence, each new data point contains information about the underlying mean
and variance. However, the mean and variance are constant over runs of trials
before jumps, or change points occur. Hence, the prior distribution, condi-








This equation states that the underlying categorymean at trial iwill be the same
as that at trial i-1 if there has not been a jump (J = 0), or could take on any value
if there has been a jump (J = 1). A similar equation may be written to describe








Jumps J occur at random with probability v, termed the volatility.
pðJiÞ= n (Equation 7)
This allows us to marginalize over J to rewrite the conditional priors:
pðmi jmi1; nÞ= ð1 nÞdðmi  mi1Þ+ nUð0;180Þ (Equation 8)
pðsi jsi1; nÞ= ð1 nÞdðsi  si1Þ+ nUð2; 40Þ (Equation 9)
This generative model may then be inverted at each trial using Bayes’ rule, with
the posterior distribution from the previous trial acting as the prior for the
current trial (see Behrens et al. [2007] for a formal proof).Neuron 71, 725–736, August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 733
Neuron
Perceptual Classification and VolatilityFirst, compute the joint distribution over m and s parametered from trials
i and i-1
pðmi ;mi1; si ; si1; njY1:i1Þ=pðmi jmi1; nÞ pðsi jsi1; nÞ pðmi1; si1; njY1:i1Þ;
(Equation 10)
where this last distribution pðmi1;si1; njY1:i1Þ is the posterior distribution
taken from the previous trial.
Next, marginalize over the parameters from the previous trial:
pðmi; si ; njY1:i1Þ=
ZZ
pðmi ;mi1; si ; si1; njY1:i1Þdmi1dsi1 (Equation 11)
Finally, incorporate the new information from the current observed angle:
pðmi ; si ; njY1:iÞ =
pðYi jmi ; siÞpðmi ; si ; njY1:i1ÞRRR
pðYijmi ; siÞpðmi ; si ; njY1:i1Þdmidsidv
(Equation 12)
All integrals are performed using numerical grid integration.
Under the Bayesian model, choice probability values were estimated by
comparing the expected probability that the stimulus Y was drawn from distri-








bmai ; bsai +pYibmbi ; bsbi  (Equation 13)
The QL model learned the value of state-action pairings as previously
described (Watkins and Dayan, 1992), where R is the feedback (correct = 1;
incorrect = 0), and t is trial.
Qðsi +1; ai + 1Þ=Qðsi ; aiÞ+a3 ½RQðsi ; aiÞ (Equation 14)
Under this formulation, states (n = 18) reflect the angle of orientation of the






The choice rule was then simply:
pðAÞ= Qðs; aÞ
Qðs; aÞ+Qðs;bÞ (Equation 16)
The WMmodel simply updated a single value for A and B whenever new infor-
mation was received, i.e., where feedback indicated that a stimulus Ywas from
the category A,
buai =Yi ;
allowing choice probability values to be calculated for the subsequent trial i+1
as:
pðAÞ= jYi+1  bmai j
jYi+ 1  bmai j+ Yi+1  bmbi  (Equation 17)
The values calculated in the equations above are in the space of A versus B,
i.e., p(A) > 0.5 predicts that the subject should choose A, and p(A) < 0 predicts
that B should be chosen. These values were used for behavioral analyses con-
cerned with predicting choice. However, for RT analyses, and for all fMRI anal-
yses, we calculated an absolute choice value estimate for each trial, directly
related to the likelihood of being correct:
choice value=23 jpðAÞ  0:5j:
Here, choice value = 0means each option is equally valued, e.g., p(correct) =
0.5. We used choice values because we had no reason to believe that subjects
would be faster, or the brain more active, when the subject chose A over B.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Magnetic resonance images were acquired with a Siemens (Erlangen,
Germany) Allegra 3.0T scanner to acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-
planar images with blood oxygenation level-dependent contrast as an index
of local increases in synaptic activity. The image parameters used were as
follows:matrix size, 643 64; voxel size, 33 3mm; echo time, 40ms; repetition
time, 2000 ms. A functional image volume comprised 32 contiguous slices of734 Neuron 71, 725–736, August 25, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.3 mm thickness (with a 1 mm interslice gap), which ensured that the whole
brain was within the field of view.
fMRI Data Preprocessing
Data were preprocessed using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London). Following correction for head motion and slice acquisi-
tion timing, functional data were spatially normalized to a standard template
brain. Images were resampled to 5 mm cubic voxels and spatially smoothed
with a 10 mm full width at half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. A 256 s
temporal high-pass filter was applied in order to exclude low-frequency
artifacts. Temporal correlations were estimated using restricted maximum
likelihood estimates of variance components using a first-order autoregressive
model. The resulting nonsphericity was used to form maximum likelihood
estimates of the activations.
fMRI Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed in a modified version of SPM2. By default, SPM2 orthog-
onalizes each parametric regressor in turn with respect to those already
entered; we ensured that no orthogonalization was used in any analysis. We
analyzed our fMRI data via two design matrices. In the first, we entered: (1)
themain effect of stimulus presentation; (2–4) parametric regressors for choice
value predicted by the Bayesian, QL, and WM models; (5) the main effect of
volatility; (6–8) the interaction between volatility and choice value for the three
models; (9) the main effect of feedback; (10) a parametric regressor encoding
the valence of the feedback; (11–13) parametric regressors encoding predic-
tion error signals predicted by the Bayesian, QL, and WM models; (14) a
nuisance regressor encoding the mean fMRI signal from 1000 randomly
selected voxels from outside the brain; and (15–20) nuisance regressors en-
coding realignment parameters (see Figure S2 for an example design matrix).
Analyses described in Figure 3 (expected value/decision entropy) pertain to
regressors 2–4 (note that decision entropy = 1-choice value); analyses
described in Figure 4 (interaction with volatility) pertain to regressors 5–8.
Note that main effects of decision- and feedback-related activity for each
model, and their interaction with volatility, are all entered simultaneously into
this design matrix, and so the results described reflect unique variance asso-
ciated with each of these predictors. Results for the common variance can be
seen in Figures S1A and S1B.
For the second design matrix, we entered (1) the main effect of stimulus, (2)
the main effect of reward, (3) the log of the main effect of volatility log(VA) (4)
where the outcome revealed the stimulus to be from category A, the absolute
angular difference between the current mean of that category and the stimulusbmai  Yi; (5) this difference divided by the standard deviation of category A
bmai  Yi= ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbsaiq ; (6) this valuemultipliedby the logvolatility ðbmai  YiÞ3lnðvai Þ= ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbsaiq .
Analyses described in Figure 5B (optimal updating) pertain to regressor 6 of
this design matrix.
Our analysis strategy was as follows. We calculated whole-brain SPMs
corresponding to the relevant contrasts, reporting voxels that survive p <
0.001 uncorrected. We report clusters where the peak exceeded at least p <
0.0001 uncorrected, except in two cases: (1) that of the volatility 3 decision
entropy interactions in the ACC, where we relaxed the threshold to p < 0.001,
on thebasis of strongapriori predictions that optimal updating signalswouldbe
observed there (Behrens et al., 2007; Kennerley et al., 2006); and (2) that of
the correlation of brain activity with choice value predicted by the Bayesian
model, where marginal (p < 0.001/0.002 uncorrected) signals were observed
in a priori predicted regions (PCC and vmPFC). Full details of voxels surviving
a threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected are described in Tables S1–S4.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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